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Avoided Deforestation: the principle
• Tropical forests are not global public goods as resources 
are under national sovereignty and local control but they 
could be considered as such as ecosystems fulfilling 
environmental services
• Avoided Deforestation (AD) is often seen as an 
International Payment for Environmental Services
• AD mechanism proposed by PNG, Brazil and other 
countries (e.g. Congo Basin’s countries), but each with 
different features
• Common points: financial rewards for countries reducing 
their deforestation rate, with carbon credits (Kyoto 
assets) or money equivalent (special fund to be set up)
• Major difficulties in the current negotiation process:
– How to choose and set up baselines?
– Should we take into account forest degradation (by logging)?
– Should it be included as a Kyoto instrument (fungible credits, 
second commitment period 2013-2017) or independent (special 
credits or money) ?
How is (additional) reduction of 
deforestation assessed?
• Monitoring physical deforestation is difficult, but one can 
guess difficulties will be reduced over time
• More difficult will be to reach an agreement on the 
benchmark against which deforestation on the 
committed period is compared to
• Most proposals suggest deriving the baseline from an 
average of past trends of deforestation
• Some others (e.g. Congo Basin countries) claim an 
“adjustment factor” allowing them to increase their future 
deforestation, but keeping a possibility to be credited 
anyway
• Some researchers would prefer “predictive” baselines 
based on anticipated rates of deforestation country by 
country
Historical reference: winners and losers
• Indonesia and Malaysia 
have had and still have 
huge deforestation rates 
since the 1980s, but 
forest cover tends (or will 
tend) now to concentrate 
on highlands: lower trend 
of deforestation is 
expected for 
“mechanical” reasons
– Future reductions likely 
to be “non additional”
• Peru, Bolivia, Congo 
Basin countries likely to 
be the “losers” with such 
baseline reference: they 
are asking the 
benchmark to anticipate 
deforestation trends
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Can we predict 
deforestation rates?
• An alternative solution would be to 
anticipate a likely “business as 
usual” deforestation rate on a future 
period
• Chomitz et al. (2007) suggest 
modeling land-use dynamics to 
calculate the baseline scenario 
– But they also pointed out a 
correlation between deforestation 
rate in the Amazon and beef price at 
farm gate. They also see a 
correlation with rainfall…
• A difference needs to be made 
between (quite) predictable variables 
(e.g. population growth) and 
guesses: 
– Who can predict often speculative 
prices for major agriculture 
commodities, such as soy, oil palm, 
beef….? 
– Who can predict the evolution of 
rainfall quantities and the risk of 
forest fires in the context of growing 
climate disorders?
Modélisation de la déforestation en Afrique Centrale
Source: Laporte et Justice, 2000.
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An overestimation of governments’ roles and 
capacities?
• Many (most?) factors 
influencing deforestation rates 
are beyond the reach of the 
governments (i.e. cash crop 
commodities price changes, 
currency rates…)
• In a complex system, it is a 
challenge to measure the 
impact of given public actions 
in terms of how many hectares 
are (not) deforested
• If deforestation slows down, 
how do we disentangle the 
effect of public (or private) 
policies and the other factors 
which occurred independently 
of the government action? Ministry of Forests and Environment, 
Gabon
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Measurement and imputation of various factors influencing 
deforestation: a framework for analysis
Carbon credits or other financial 
incentives?
• From a “Kyoto-inside” perspective: fears that AD scheme 
might generate new huge quantities of “hot air” with a 
downward pressure on the price of emission permits
– Recent report from CDM executive board suggests 20% of 
carbon credits are “non additional”…
• An alternative:
– “De-couple” from Kyoto instruments: money instead of carbon 
credits through an international fund to tackle deforestation
– Target, in priority, field actors instead of the Governments
– Use a range of PES to favor changes in farmers’ productive 
practices and reward genuine conservation efforts (case-by-case 
assessment)
– Working with governments to remove “perverse incentives”
(inappropriate subsidies, fiscal systems…) and overcome 
structural threats, such as land tenure insecurity, weakness and
corruption within controlling institutions and the justice…
The case for an 
International Fund
for tackling 
deforestation
• Seeing AD as an umbrella for local 
PES, not as an international PES…
• A Fund can provide the financial 
support for policies and reforms 
needed to curb deforestation
• Would need a mechanism to be 
abounded on sufficient and 
sustainable basis (taxes?)
• No more risk of “hot air”, but the 
additionality issue remains 
especially with the lowest 
opportunity cost areas
Past deforestation in Côte d’Ivoire
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Additionality v. Affordability
Opportunity
Cost 
Proportion of non-deforestation
or avoided deforestation
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The “compensation” concept: toward 
a generalization of financial claims?
• The minimum condition for the success of any scheme is 
strong signals of political will to enforce the law:
– Paying stakeholders for law observance is a contestable (and 
contested) principle which might incite law compliers to become 
non-compliers…
– The risk is to be told:  “if you don’t pay me I will allow my 
forests to get cleared”, making it difficult to concentrate 
payments only on “objectively threatened forests”
• Indonesia wants to be paid US$5-$20 per hectare not to 
destroy its remaining forests (Reuters, Oct. 8 2007)
• Minister of Environment of DR Congo : « Nous 
acceptons de contribuer à l'équilibre du climat, 
mais nous exigeons 3 milliards de dollars pour tout ce 
que nos forêts apportent comme bien pour résorber le 
dioxyde de carbone dégagé par les pays industrialisés »
Xinhua, Oct. 2, 2007).
Economic efficiency and 
the responsibility principle
• Financial rewards (to governments) for standing forests 
without regard for policies carried out would be 
extremely costly and of doubtful effectiveness
• Environmental responsibility must not be a claim 
addressed to Northern countries only: the other side of 
the coin of the (uncontested) sovereignty (on forest 
resources) should be the responsibility vis-à-vis the 
forests as global environmental services providers
• Conditional rewards of genuine efforts of governments 
and local actors could be a more acceptable negotiation 
basis  
• The ultimate condition is (still) the collective choices and 
collective/individual behaviors: forests are converted for 
feeding beef, producing biofuels, pulp… we are 
consuming more and more…
